Should I Be Held Responsible for What I Believe?

Sin Man Lea Cheng

2025

Consider two worlds. In the first one, people are selfish, treacherous, and dishonest, but through some kind of luck, only good things happen. In the second world, people are charitable, loyal, and trustworthy, but, again, through luck, only bad things happen. Which world would you rather live in? I certainly would want to live in a world where good things happen. In this essay, I will argue that because of the existence and prevalence of moral luck, actual consequentialism is the most appropriate ethical framework through which we should morally judge somebody. Therefore, through that framework, we should not be held morally responsible for our beliefs, but only our actions and the results. 

Before we examine why we should not be morally responsible for our beliefs, we must understand what beliefs are. Having a belief, in my reading, extends beyond what a person thinks is true. As Peirce puts it in The Fixation of Belief, “belief…puts us into such a condition that we shall behave in a certain way, when the occasion arises” (Peirce 10). Indeed, beliefs lead to dispositions, someone’s general tendencies, which lead to actions, the specific behaviours someone performs. For instance, if someone believes helping others is important (belief), they may generally act generously (disposition), leading them to donate to charity (action). 

What, then, does it mean to be morally responsible for a belief or for anything? A person, A, is morally responsible for something, X (a belief, disposition, or action), if X is apt to change someone else’s judgement of A in terms of whether they are good, bad, neutral, etc. For example, suppose Alice donates a significant portion of her income to charity. This action could lead us to

call Alice “good” for some possible reasons; perhaps it’s because her donation helps others, or perhaps it demonstrates her generosity. In any case, the action of donating to charity makes the positive moral judgement of Alice apt. On the contrary, consider Bob, who frequently steals money from his friends and family. This behaviour causes us to aptly judge Bob as “bad,” possibly because his actions harm others or demonstrate his dishonesty. 

On that note, ethical theories are the foundations for how we morally assess someone. For the sake of this essay, we will only discuss the three major theories: deontology, virtue ethics, and consequentialism. Deontology is the branch of ethics that emphasises the importance of duty, rules, and intentions over virtues or consequences, as popularised in modern philosophy by Kant in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Central to Kant’s deontology is the “categorical imperative,” which serves as a foundational principle for determining moral duties. Kant describes categorical imperatives as commands or moral laws that everyone must adhere to, regardless of their personal desires or any special circumstances (31). For example, a deontological doctor feels a duty to truthfully inform a patient with a serious but treatable illness about their condition despite potential distress. By doing so, the doctor upholds the principle that telling the truth is a universal moral duty, making a positive moral judgement apt in the deontological sense. 

Virtue ethics focuses on the character and virtues of moral agents rather than on the rules or consequences of specific actions. Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, roots virtue ethics in the idea that the purpose of human life is to achieve eudaimonia, which is often translated as “flourishing” or “happiness.” According to Aristotle, eudaimonia is accomplished through the cultivation of virtues, which are character traits that enable individuals to live in accordance with reason and to fulfil their potential as human beings (Aristotle 172). Consider a student who accidentally sees the answers to an upcoming exam and decides to cheat. This decision undermines fairness and integrity. Through the lens of a virtue ethicist, this action is unvirtuous, making a negative moral judgement of the student apt. 

Finally, consequentialism focuses on the consequences instead of the virtues or moral axioms. In particular, Bentham, in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, introduces the principle of utility. This principle holds that the best action is the one that maximises overall happiness or pleasure and minimises overall pain or suffering (Bentham 11). For instance, a CEO discovers a new drug has serious undisclosed side effects. The CEO can either pull the drug, risking bankruptcy, or ignore the side effects, causing harm. A consequentialist would consider withdrawing the drug as “good” since the welfare of the general public is larger than that of the CEO’s company. To clarify the possible interpretations of consequentialism, this essay will only focus on “actual consequentialism,” which only values the actual consequences of an action, disregarding intended or possible outcomes (Sinnott-Armstrong). 

It is important to note that all three of the ethical theories are influenced by luck. Kant said “a good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes…it is good in itself,” and that we should not be judged morally on events that we have no control over (7). However, Nagel raised the point that almost nothing, including our good or bad wills or beliefs, is under our control and thereby introduced the concept of moral luck. Moral luck describes situations where the moral judgement of an individual depends significantly on factors outside of their control. Nagel categorises moral luck into four types: constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, causal luck, and resultant luck (27-28). 

Constitutive luck refers to the inherent aspects of a person’s character and personality, to quote Nagel, their “inclinations, capabilities, and temperaments” (28). Consider a child brought up in the Nazi youth, internalising racism and homophobia, who, if raised in the 21st century, would not have. Then, there’s circumstantial luck, which involves “the things we are called upon to do” 

and the specific situations and problems one faces (Nagel 33). Consider again a soldier who is drafted into war and faces moral dilemmas that they would never encounter in a time of peace. Causal luck is “luck in how one is determined by antecedent circumstances,” or simply, prior events (Nagel 28). Imagine a person who refrains from committing a crime because they happened to receive a piece of moral advice at a crucial moment in their life, altering their decision-making process. Finally, resultant luck is “luck in the way one’s actions and projects turn out” (Nagel 28). Imagine someone who drives home after drinking and makes it safely without any accidents, despite the inherent risk involved. Notably, none of these four lucks are within an individual’s control. 

These different moral lucks have drastic effects on moral evaluation through the three ethical theories. 

To begin with, circumstantial luck places people in situations where they may or may not have to make moral decisions, which equally affects all three theories as it determines the context inwhich moral agency is exercised. Casual luck also affects all three theories, as the prior events shape an individual and cause them to make the decisions these theories assess. 

Both deontology and virtue ethics are heavily affected by constitutive luck. For deontology, consider two people tasked with the moral duty of telling the truth: Alice, who was raised in a supportive environment that valued honesty and has a calm temperament, finds it easy to testify truthfully in court; Bob, who grew up in a chaotic environment where dishonesty was a survival mechanism and has a naturally anxious disposition, struggles immensely and ends up lying under pressure. Deontology would still compel us to call Alice “good” and Bob “bad,” despite the fact that neither childhood experiences nor temperaments are under either one’s control. Alice simply had good constitutive luck that led her to tell the truth while Bob did not. 

This applies similarly to virtue ethics. In virtue ethics, Alice’s upbringing and natural dispositions would facilitate her development of the virtue of honesty, while Bob’s less favourable circumstances would hinder his moral growth. Consequently, virtue ethics would also unfairly judge “lucky” Alice as more virtuous than “unlucky” Bob. Finally, since consequentialism is inherently linked to outcomes, it is highly sensitive to resultant luck. For example, consider two doctors who perform identical surgeries with the same level of skill and care. One patient recovers perfectly, while the other suffers unforeseen complications due to a rare condition. Under consequentialism, the first doctor might be judged as being more “good” because the outcome was positive, while the second doctor might be called “bad” despite having acted with equal competence and intention. However, the first doctor is simply luckier than the second, even though the moral judgements largely differ. 

I now argue that consequentialism is the most appropriate ethical framework, not because resultant luck is inherently less arbitrary than constitutive luck, but because it acknowledges that our beliefs, dispositions, and actions, as well as our intentions and virtues, are significantly shaped by factors beyond our control. When we choose to act morally, with respect to deontology or virtue ethics, we are often simply fortunate to possess traits and circumstances that enable such behaviour. Or, with respect to consequentialism, fortunate enough to inhabit a body that performs actions with positive outcomes. It seems that morality is thrust upon us by the universe. Since moral luck pervades every aspect of a person, it becomes impractical to judge the moral rightness of the person’s beliefs, dispositions, and intentions. So, in what world may we be moral? Obviously, we may then only be moral in a world in which we do “good things.” But which things are good? That is, which worlds are the “good worlds”? To answer this, consider the example below of two hypothetical worlds. 

World 1: In this world, everyone holds virtuous beliefs and follows their duties. These inhabitants deeply value kindness, altruism, and the well-being of others. For instance, a scientist in this world, motivated by the noble intention to cure cancer to decrease human suffering, develops a new experimental treatment. Unfortunately, despite their good intentions, this treatment inadvertently releases a deadly virus that causes a pandemic. Millions of people are killed. The inhabitants’ actions, despite their good beliefs, constantly lead to disastrous outcomes.

World 2: In this world, everyone holds vicious beliefs and does not follow their duties. These inhabitants are selfish, greedy, and primarily concerned with their own gain. For example, a group of corporate executives, eager to increase their profits at any cost, invest in developing a drug. However, the drug they create turns out to be an incredibly effective cure for cancer, and it accidentally gets leaked to the public by some act of carelessness. In turn, it saved countless lives and improved the overall health of the population. Despite their self-centred and unethical motivations, the actions of these inhabitants always lead to highly beneficial outcomes. 

Consider for a moment which world you would rather live in. A world filled with pain and torture or pleasure and happiness? In this sense, World 2 should be considered a “good” world because, despite the inhabitants’ flawed intentions, the outcome of their actions significantly improves the overall well-being of the population. Then, it would seem paradoxical to label the inhabitants of World 2 as “bad” when their actions only result in good outcomes. If the inhabitants are labelled as good, it reinforces the idea that the moral value of actions is best judged by their consequences rather than the intentions behind them. 

If deontologists/virtue ethicists remain unconvinced, then they must stand by their theory and genuinely prefer to live in World 1. 

Now, let’s return to my main point: that we should never be held morally responsible for our beliefs. Since all three theories are on par with respect to moral luck and actual consequentialism coheres best with our intuitions about the goodness and badness of possible worlds, we can only hold each other accountable through this framework. Notably, beliefs do not factor into such evaluations. Therefore, we should not, and indeed cannot, be held morally responsible for our beliefs, only ever for our actions.

Works Cited

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by W.D. Ross, revised by J.O. Urmson, edited by Jonathan Barnes, Princeton University Press, 1984. 

Bentham, Jeremy. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Edited by J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, Oxford University Press, 1996. 

Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Mary Gregor, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 

Nagel, Thomas. Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press, 1979. 

Peirce, C. S. 'The Fixation of Belief'. Popular Science Monthly, vol. 12, no. 1, 1877, pp. 1–15. check format of citation later 

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. "Consequentialism." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, Winter 2023 ed., Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2023, 

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/consequentialism/.